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I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay I discuss the criteria that goes into formulat-
ing a state's response to ordinary terrorism and state-sponsored
terrorism. In doing so, I first establish an acceptable and help-
ful definition of "terrorism" that distinguishes it from other
forms of insurrection, and then seek to define "state-sponsored
terrorism" in the context of international law. I also discuss the
special case of religious terrorism under the Taliban regime of
Afghanistan, and then discuss the criteria that, under interna-
tional law, may shape a state's response to terrorism.
II. THE NEED TO DEFINE TERRORISM
Terrorism is a term used frequently nowadays and has
been extensively treated in legal literature for about thirty
years. There is disagreement, however, as to what might be an
acceptable and universal definition of the word. I point out some
of the key features that might go into a clear and acceptable
definition that the international community might endorse.
A. General Definition
The term "terrorism" is of French origin and is believed to
have first been used in 1798 when terrorism was explicitly iden-
tified with the "reign of terror" of the French Revolution.1 One
standard definition from the Oxford English Dictionary is: "pol-
icy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is
adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of
terrorizing or condition of being terrorized."2 However, that def-
inition is circular and therefore wanting for further
explication.3
The U.S. Department of Defense, the FBI, the Department
of Justice, and other official sources define terrorism with sev-
eral common strands:
1 See Dictionnaire, Supplement 775 (Paris, an VII (1978)).
2 XVII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 821 (2d ed. 1989) (second definition of
terrorism).
3 Another circular definition is found in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which defines terrorism as "engag[ing] in
terrorist activity 'as' in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization
.. to commit or incite to commit. . . a terrorist activity. " 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2001).
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" "IT]he unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence
by a revolutionary organization against individuals or
property with the intention of coercing or intimidating
governments or societies, often for political or ideological
purposes." 4
" "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civil-
ian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives."5
" "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or
clandestine state agents."'6
" "violent criminal conduct apparently intended: (a) to in-
timidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence
the conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or (c) to affect the conduct of a government by assassina-
tion or kidnapping."7
A proposed convention drafted by the International Law
Association provides its own definition of terrorism:
An international terrorist offence is any serious act of violence or
threat thereof by an individual whether acting alone or in associa-
tion with other persons, organizations, places, transportation or
communications systems or against members of the general pub-
lic for the purpose of intimidating such persons, causing injury to
or the death of such persons, disrupting the activities of such in-
ternational organizations, of causing loss, detriment or damage to
such places or property, or of interfering with such transportation
and communications systems in order to undermine friendly rela-
tions among States or among the nationals of different States or
to extort concessions from States.8
4 Rushworth M. Kidder, Unmasking Terrorism: The Fear of Fear Itself in
VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 14 (Bernard Schecterman & Martin Slann eds., 3d ed.
1993) (U.S. Department of Justice).
5 Id (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation).
6 Id (U.S. Department of State).
7 Id (U.S. Department of Justice).
8 Art. I (J) of Draft Single Convention on the Legal Control of International
Terrorism (Int'l Law Ass'n 1980) in International Law Association, Report of the
Fifty-Ninth Conference Held at Belgrade, August 17th, 1980 to August 23rd, 1980,
at 497-504 (1982). The traditional political offense exception commonly associated
with extradition is not applicable in this definition of terrorist offence. See id. at
502-3, commentary to art. II.
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These definitions refer to unlawful force as opposed to law-
ful force.9 Unlawful force is something upon which people might
disagree. For instance, within its political philosophy, a terror-
ist group itself might construe the use of force as a "just cause"
under international legal parlance that falls outside of terror-
ism. But to a targeted society, such as the United States in the
attacks of September 11, 2001, the acts of violence are objec-
tively and intrinsically unlawful and without adequate
justification.
Terrorism takes on various forms, from hijackings and bus
bombings, to chemical, biological and nuclear attacks. The rela-
tive seriousness of a given attack may also vary in terms of the
intensity and destructiveness of force deployed, ranging from an
ordinary bombing of a small group to the extra-lethal slaughter
of September 11, 2001.
B. Purpose of Terrorism
The purpose of terrorism, generally, is to change the politi-
cal, social or economic structures or policies of a perceived en-
emy state or territory by means of coercion. In a broad sense,
terrorists seek a psychological goal: to embitter humanity, to
polarize people and society; to pit one nation against another;
and one group of people against another. Terrorists seek to
destabilize world order.
Terrorism need not be exercised toward political ends, and
we see that religious terrorists may focus their aims on a world-
wide quest for religious hegemony rather than on specific politi-
cal points. There is a lex talionis (an eye for an eye) retaliatory
quality that grounds terrorism. Its aims are directed to the col-
lective society of a perceived oppressor, so that any member of
that society is the enemy, including the "innocents." Terrorists
believe they have a mission to expiate themselves by purging
the taint of oppression by attack and slaughter.
C. Nature of Terrorist Groups
Terrorist groups are diverse because of the diverse ideolo-
gies and religions that shape their agendas. Members of sepa-
rate terrorist groups sometimes collaborate or share in the
9 See supra notes 6, 7 and 8.
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training of recruits, even though their causes might be quite dif-
ferent. They may be linked together through financing, weap-
ons, supplies, and may provide one another with mutual
support, false documentation, places of safe refuge, training
camps, and exchange of personnel. Terrorist groups are usually
centrally coordinated but sometimes have autonomous
agendas.10
Terrorists themselves shun the term "terrorism." Rather,
they regard violence against unarmed civilians as a "manifesta-
tion of a just, defensive war."" For instance, they view an act of
hijacking as a justly motivated deed in the context of a "war" in
which civilian targets are "soldiers" in an active military
"front."'1 2 Some terrorists believe that their pains are caused by
the targeted society. Once they have identified a society as the
source of their problems, terrorists believe the cure is to destroy
the source.
D. Personality Traits of Terrorists
Much has been said of the supposed psychopathic personal-
ity of terrorists. The popular media view is that terrorists have
"diseased minds" or are "psychopaths."1 3 Often the diagnosis is
based on the simple assumption that normal people are incapa-
ble of horrific terrorist attacks. However, the personal qualities
required for terrorism may actually screen out persons with
psychopathology.14 Opportunities for diagnostic interviews with
political terrorists are relatively rare. But in a 1986 study of
imprisoned terrorists, psychopathology was not seen as the
source of terrorist motivation. 15
The root of a terrorist's personality is much more complex
than can be adequately described by diagnostic labels. As stated
in the DSM-IV on what constitutes mental disorder, "Neither
10 See The Terrorism Research Center, Terrorist Intelligence Operations
(1996), at http://www.terrorism.com/terrorismlIntelOperations.shtml.
11 David Aaron Schwartz, International Terrorism and Islamic Law, 29
COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 629, 641 (1991).
12 See id.
13 See Eric D. Shaw, Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alter-
native to the Psychopathology Model, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 359, 361 (1986).
14 See Clark R. McCauley, The Psychology of Terrorism, Social Science Re-
search Council (2001), at http://www.ssrc.org/septll/essays/mccauley.htm.
15 See Shaw, supra note 13, at 360.
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deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor con-
flicts that are primarily between the individual and society are
mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of
a dysfunction in the individual .... 16
Roughly speaking, there appears to be some common per-
sonal developmental paths and socialization processes among
terrorists. There is a general theme of a childhood that involves
serious narcissistic damage. 17 That is, they often acquire rage
from disruptions in family life, have lost one or more parents at
an early age, or have suffered some other early damage to their
self-esteem.' They often come from affluent and middle-to-up-
per class families that have enjoyed some social prestige. 19 As a
group, terrorists tend to have been unsuccessful in obtaining
their desired traditional place in society, which seems to con-
tribute to their frustration. 20
Being in a terrorist group is a solution to the frustration
some may feel in not finding a niche in traditional society.
Through the terrorist group one gains a new role in society, al-
beit a negative one, which compensates for past losses. Group
membership provides a sense of power, an intense and close in-
terpersonal connection, social status, potential access to wealth,
and a share in what may be a grandiose but noble social de-
sign.2 ' Members of a terrorist group, many whom would other-
wise be alone and alienated, find acceptance among others who
feel the same way. Their inner doubts are quelled and shored up
with an ideology, and they at long last feel accepted. 22
People do not ordinarily join groups, extremist or other-
wise, unless there is some reward for doing so.23 For some in the
16 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxii (4th ed.
1994).
17 See Shaw, supra note 13, at 362.
18 See generally The Way to Get Rid of Terrorism, THE NASSAU GUARDIAN,
Mar. 4, 2002, available at http://www.thenassauguardian.com/newsdisplay.php?
prid=4680&src=freeport.
19 See generally Anil Athale, The Art of Media Warfare, Rediff on the Net,
Sept. 8, 2001, at http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/sep/08spec.htm.
20 See Shaw, supra note 13, at 365.
21 See id. at 366.
22 See id.
23 See Marisa Reddy Pynchon & Randy Borum, Assessing Threats of Targeted
Group Violence: Contributions from Social Psychology, 17 No. 3 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
339, 349 (1999).
[Vol. 14:77
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss1/3
FORMULATION OF A STATE'S RESPONSE
third world, becoming part of a terrorist group not only im-
proves self-esteem and increases peer approval but also pro-
vides tangible benefits such as shelter, clothing, and a
structured environment. 24 Terrorist recruits often come to de-
fine themselves by the group and its values and intentions. 25
Terrorist members may start to see others outside the
group as having negative traits and behaviors, and this can lead
to stereotyping of members of other countries or dehumanizing
or demonizing anyone who is outside their culture.26 Terrorist
recruits may perceive the outside world, external events, and
the actions of others in a certain bias, particularly when, as in
Afghanistan, the group is largely isolated and society must rely
on the leaders for information and current events. 27 Informa-
tion received about current events may be filtered and distorted
in a manner that meets the terrorist leaders' needs and
motivations.
The impact on terrorist recruits is reduced accountability
for violence. That is, individuals acting under the auspices of a
group may feel that their personal level of responsibility is re-
duced or infused through the group's collective viability. Also,
an individual member is more likely to engage in behaviors and
actions that are more violent than those in which he would en-
gage outside of the group context. 28
Terrorists attempt to blind the adherents to any sense of
humanity for the other side. They want the adherents to believe
that all truth rests with the terrorists and that the use of unre-
strained violence is a lawful and moral tool to deploy. 29
Suicide bombings, a method embraced by Islamic groups in
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, are said to be "immensely em-
powering to many people in the region who no longer believe
that their governments can do anything to relieve their humili-
ation and improve their conditions."30 This strategy frees des-
24 See id.
25 See id. at 351.
26 See id. at 345.
27 See id.
28 See Pynchon & Borum, supra note 23, at 345-46.
29 See Christopher L. Blakesley, The Modern Blood Feud: Thoughts on the
Philosophy of Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 3 CATH. L. 177, 190-91 (1990).
30 Shibley Telhami, Why Suicide Terrorism Takes Root, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2002, at A23.
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perate and helpless individuals from an unbearable rage
regarding Israeli occupation, and many Palestinians regard this
as an acceptable means of retaliation. 31 Some of the suicide
bombings in Israel do not fit the typical pattern of young, single
men, usually poor, with little hope, but have included promising
young women students as well. 32 One-writer comments: "It's
hard to say that these Palestinian bombers even have political
objectives. It's almost nihilistic. It's almost a kind of epidemic, a
cult of death that comes out of a sense of cultural humilia-
tion."33 Proponents of suicide bombing do not regard their ap-
proach as terrorism but as a legitimate anti-colonial revolt
against an occupying power, analogous to the American colo-
nists' revolt.34 The Organization of the Islamic Conference has
proclaimed: "We reject any attempt to link terrorism to the
struggle of the Palestinian people in the exercise of their ina-
lienable right to establish their independent state."35
But the norms of international law suggest that it is terror-
ism, plain and simple, rather than freedom-fighting, when non-
state actors such as Hamas or Al Qaeda deliberately target
noncombatants with the objective of instilling fear.36
E. Tactics Employed
Terrorist acts are usually carefully planned and executed.
Terrorists want to induce widespread fear and reaction among
civilians so as to weaken confidence in government, and divert
money and attention from other concerns.37 Tactics are there-
fore aimed at instilling fear in the minds of the international
community and especially the targeted community. The tactics
involved need to be sufficient to instill fright and paralyze the
infrastructure of the targeted group. While civilians are the im-
mediate targets of violence, the ultimate targets are not inno-
31 See id.
32 See Todd S. Purdum, What Do You Mean, 'Terrorist'?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2002, at Week in Review 1.
33 Id., quoting Jessica Stern, a lecturer on terrorism at Harvard University.
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 See id., quoting Jessica Stern.
37 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 629.
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cent victims but the nation's very existence. 38 Terrorist
activities are planned surreptitiously so that it is difficult to
know with absolutely certainty that a particular group or
targeted facility is actually under a present and imminent
threat.
III. TERRORISM DISTINGUISHED FROM NON-TERRORISM
Terrorism is different from other types of group violence,
such as action by one sovereign state against another in war, or
insurrections, anticolonial rebellions, and other acts of freedom
fighters that international law generally accepts as lawful.39
A. Terrorism Distinguished from an Act of War by One
Sovereign State Against Another
This distinction is important because states have a host of
international commitments that create an incentive to avoid all-
out warfare, and incentives to engage in sustained diplomacy to
achieve national goals, while a terrorist organization may oper-
ate without mitigation.40 Conventional war is different from
terrorism, and terrorists from soldiers because, first of all, ter-
rorists are ideological, political, or religious extremists, not
state deployed armed forces. Also, terrorists cannot be attacked
in the same way as a state because they have no specific bound-
aries or territory.
Terrorism is similar to conventional war insofar as they
both have parallel goals and rationales, i.e., attacking the politi-
cal, social or economic structures of a given state.41 As in war,
terrorists believe the enemy threatens their very existence and
they accept the possibility of their own death in pursuit of the
38 A major terrorist goal is to make government so oppressive that it will en-
gender popular opposition and lead to the collapse of the government. See Robert
H. Kupperman & Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism and Social Control: Challenge
and Response, 6 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 52, 52 (1979).
39 See generally Seumas Milne, Terror and Tyranny, GUARDIAN OF LONDON
(Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.commondreams.org/views0l/1025-06.htm.
40 Sovereign states endeavor to achieve changes in policy of other nations not
through the use of violence but by diplomatic means. A terrorist group is less vul-
nerable to international sanctions than is a state, as it does not possess a visible
economy, land holdings, or an identified populace.
41 See RICHARD FALK, REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES: THE DUAL FACE
OF TERRORISM, 76, 90-93 (1988).
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cause. In war, innocent civilians may not be used as targets for
military victory, while terrorists freely choose from civilian
targets. Terrorists engage in violence against people who are
not at war and who do not understand themselves to be at war,
and against unarmed, defenseless civilians.
Negotiating with a terrorist organization is problematic,
since it is not the representative of a state and therefore Article
33 of the United Nations Charter does not apply. Article 33 re-
quires parties in a dispute that threatens international peace to
exhaust all peaceful means to resolve their dispute, including
"negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or ju-
dicial settlement."42 Since "terrorist groups are not structured
like states, they are incapable of negotiating effectively or en-
forcing their agreements."43 Apart from that, negotiations with
terrorist groups are shunned by states because it suggests psy-
chological recognition and legitimacy to its organization and
activities .44
B. Terrorism Distinguished from Legitimate Struggles and
Other Permissible Insurgencies Under International
Law
International law holds that certain acts of aggression can
be justified on the rationale of "just cause" (jus ad bellum), so
long as "just means" are employed.45 Attacks based on self-de-
termination, anticolonialism or other categories of "just cause"
are distinguished from terrorism, although drawing such a line
may sometimes be difficult. 46
When internal oppression by a totalitarian regime necessi-
tates warfare to achieve freedom, international law accepts that
the desire to attain freedom should be construed not as terror-
42 U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. 1.
43 Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to Terror-
ism, 2 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 72 (1991).
44 See generally Terrorists: Should Governments Negotiate With Them?, Public
Debate, at http://www.publicdebate.com.au/is/703/bg.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2002).
45 See Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and
Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 242 (1995).
46 See Jan Garrett, Just War Theory and Self-Determination, Western Ken-
tucky University (2001), available at http://www.wku.edu/-jan.garrett/
justwar.htm.
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ism but as an act of self-defense.4 7 The right to use insurgent
force to prevent the trampling of "inalienable" natural rights
was affirmed in the Declaration of Independence, and it was
this sort of lawful insurgency that established the United
States.48
Acts of internal disruption, assassinations, kidnappings,
destruction, and injury have to be analyzed according to the
surrounding circumstances. Many struggles for political free-
dom, such as the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua or the anti-
Castro insurgency supported by the United Nations, have had
some features in common with full-blown terrorism,49 but are
distinguished as legitimate assertions of inalienable rights.
50
Acts of self-determination are similar to warfare in that the
objectives are to gain the support of the people, disarm the mili-
tary of the offending regime, and to carry out a massive propa-
ganda campaign in the international community.
If acts of insurgency are based on a "just cause," there is a
further question as to whether the acts are based on the princi-
ple of "just means."51 Otherwise, violence such as sending an-
thrax through the mail, hijacking of airplanes, kidnapping or
attacking diplomats and international business people, and
other indiscriminate slaughter of civilians could pass for an ex-
pression of politically motivated violence.52
47 See R. I. R. Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful Interference with Civil Avia-
tion on World Peace and the Social Order, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 449, 463 (1995).
48 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). When
Thomas Jefferson worked on the Declaration of Independence, he asserted that the
people have the right of revolution whenever a government becomes destructive of
"certain unalienable rights," and he had in mind a natural order in a world whose
laws are external to all human will and which are discoverable through human
reason.
49 See generally Transcript, Summit of the Americas, May 8, 1997 available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latinamerica/may97/summit_5-8a.html.
50 See generally Louis Rene Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the
Military Commander available at http://icd.web.cc.purdue.edu-beres/milit.html.
51 See Beres, supra note 45, at 245.
52 See Louis Rene Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military
Commander, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 2, 18 (1995). The idea of just means in the con-
text of political insurgency received classic expression in Cicero's account of natu-
ral law in De Republica, in which he indicates why politically motivated violence
by insurgents must be comported with "right reason." "True law is right reason in
agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting;
it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibi-
tions .... It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal
2002]
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The international community places great importance on
the doctrine of "just means" in a significant number of multilat-
eral treaties that ban, even in wartime, acts often performed by
terrorists. 53 Such acts include "violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture . . . outrages upon personal dignity. . . ,,54 Thus, the
international community tends to condemn localized insurrec-
tions in which freedom fighters attack unarmed groups of inno-
cent civilians.
C. Acts Committed Primarily in Self-Defense are
Distinguished from Terrorism
The notion of exonerating national liberation movements
from actions based on self-defense (including preemptive
strikes) was codified in various U.N. resolutions, particularly
Resolution 38/130.55 The area of self-defense presents its own
set of controversies beyond the scope of this paper. For in-
stance, the Palestine Liberation Organization returning fire on
Israeli jets, or Israeli preemptive strikes on targets such as on
the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 or leftist and rightists
fighting in El Salvador street skirmishes may generally be con-
sidered self-defensive. However, acts that start out in self-de-
fense can escalate to full blown terrorism when the mode of
aggression becomes ruthless and devoid of moral scruples.
IV. DEFINING STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM AND ITS
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
Terrorist groups' aspirations, notwithstanding, do not
claim to represent or constitute internationally recognized
states, yet their reach and sophistication can be global. 56 Under
any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely." MARcus T. CICERO, THE
REPUBLIC: BOOK III, reprinted in SOCIETY, LAw AND MORALITY 35-36 (Frederick A.
Olafson ed., 1961).
53 Article 3 of the Geneva Convention prohibits certain acts against "persons
taking no active part in hostilities" during an "armed conflict not of an interna-
tional character." See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949).
54 Id.
55 See Jeffrey Allan McCredie, The Responsibility of States for Private Acts of
International Terrorism, 1 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 69, 88-91 (1985).
56 See Joshua A. Levy, New Era, New Threats: Wrestling with Interstitial Ac-
tors, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 523 (2000).
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international law, terrorism cannot be committed by states qua
states.57 State sponsored terrorism, however, is another matter,
for if terrorism is state sponsored, other nations can direct their
response to terrorist attacks at the state itself (in addition to
the terrorist groups).
As far back as 1977, commentators were suggesting that
the attempt "to hold states responsible in damages for the acts
of terrorists when such acts can be attributed to them repre-
sents a strategic use of traditional international law norms
which... may produce short-run benefits and.. .will contribute
to long-run interests of the world community."58 Under interna-
tional law, states now are under a general duty to carry out pre-
vention of terrorism by "due diligence," which means that all
reasonable measures under the circumstances must be taken to
prevent terrorist acts.59 The toleration by a state of the use of
its resources for terrorist activity against foreigners also serves
as a basis for liability under state responsibility principles. 60
Willful neglect or lack of due diligence creates liability as well. 61
If it can be established that state-sponsored terrorism ex-
ists, then the sponsoring state may be in violation of Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits "Members" of the United
Nations from taking forcible action against the territorial integ-
rity and political independence of other states, although this Ar-
ticle has been interpreted to apply to non-member states as
well. 62 That provision was applied by the U.N. Security Council
in 1992 to impose economic sanctions on Libya for its connection
with terrorist activities and for its refusal to extradite two Lib-
yan nationals alleged to have participated in the 1988 bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 63 The Resolu-
tion stated:
57 See Louis Rene Beres, supra note 52, at 243.
58 Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 217, 221 (1976).
59 See id. at 230-31, 245-46.
60 See id. at 257, 274.
61 See id. at 306.
62 See NATALINO RoNzITI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY
COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 13-14 (1985). See also
Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, 140 RECUEIL
DES CouRs 283 (1974).
63 See Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes to Prohibit Arms Exports and
Flights to Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at A4.
20021
13
PACE INT'L L. REV.
[E]very state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or ac-
quiescing in organized activities within its territory directed to-
ward the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat
or use of force. 64
In addition, the United Nations had this explication of state-spon-
sored terrorism affecting regions outside a State: Every State has
the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organiza-
tion of irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries, for
incursion into the territory of another State. Every State has the
duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or partici-
pating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed to-
wards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in
the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.6 5 (empha-
sis added).
This has been interpreted to constrain states from the
maintenance of terrorist training camps in the techniques of as-
sassination, destruction and sabotage, the collection of funds,
directly or indirectly, providing of direct financing for training
camps and other programs, the purchase of arms, ammunition
and explosives and preparation of foreign propaganda. 66
One might analyze the existence of state-sponsored terror-
ism along the lines of a four-part continuum ranging from ac-
tive to passive support:
a. The state actively sponsors, controls or directs the ter-
rorist activities.
b. The state encourages the activities by providing train-
ing, equipment, money and/or transportation.
c. The state tolerates the terrorists operating as such
within its borders by making no effort to arrest or oust them,
although it does not actively support them. By not ejecting or
arresting the terrorists, the state is "enabling" them to carry on
their activities.
64 U.N. SCOR, Res. 731, (1992), reprinted in Resolution on Libya Embargo:
Barring Takeoff and Landing "to Any Aircraft," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at A12.
65 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, (1970).
66 See Abeyratne, supra note 47, at 466.
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d. The state, due to political factors or inherent weakness
of leaders, is simply unable to deal effectively with the ter-
rorists; therefore there is inaction.67
The International Court of Justice has suggested that ac-
tive support by a state constitutes a substantial degree of state
control, which would be sufficient to legally charge a state for
an "armed attack" (as used in Article 51) committed by interna-
tional terrorists within its borders. 68
Active support is considered clear "when a government pro-
vides weapons, technical advice, transportation, aid and encour-
agement to terrorists on a substantial scale ... ." (Category b). 69
This does not imply that a state has actual control over the ter-
rorist group (Category a). Mere logistical support, provision for
training, or just providing a secure base of operations would
seem to be sufficient to constitute active support under the pre-
sent consensus of the international community.
A host government also engages in state-sponsored terror-
ism where it merely tolerates the use of its territory as a stag-
ing area for terrorist attacks and refuses requests to shut down
those operations when it could do so (Category c). 70
Another suggested continuum that identifies the extent of
state sponsorship of terrorism is as follows:
a. State officials perform terrorist acts;
b. The state employs unofficial agents for terrorist acts;
c. The state supplies financial aid or weapons;
d. The state supplies other logistical support;
e. The state acquiesces to the presence of terrorist bases
within its territory; or
f. The state provides neither active nor passive help.71
This continuum might be peppered with other things like
providing intelligence support, providing training, providing
diplomatic assets, providing high technology, weapons or explo-
67 See Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Mili-
tary Force, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 144, 150 (2000).
68 See id. at 155.
69 Id. at n. 47, citing Oscar Schacter, The Lawful Use of Force: Law and U.S.
Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37, 45 (Council on Foreign Relations 1989).
70 See Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin
Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 565 (1999).
71 See Antonio Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response to
Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 598-99 (1989).
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sives, providing transportation, tacit support, rhetorical sup-
port, support in the controlled press, or other direct or indirect
financial support. 72 These criteria help define state sponsored
terrorism in degrees, covering a wide range of possible scena-
rios, from active planning, direction and control of terrorist op-
erations, to indirect activities that aid and abet the terrorists,
such as providing intelligence, weapons, money, and support in
state controlled media.
Ordinarily there is a presumption that each sovereign state
will control criminal conduct in its own territory by preventing
or punishing those who might mount armed attacks against
other states. 73 If the host government has no interest in con-
trolling terrorists under its jurisdiction, or if the host govern-
ment is intimidated from doing so, the failure to respond could
be construed as state sponsorship under the above criteria.
Other sources clearly show that international law imposes
duties on states, their agents and officials to prevent certain
terrorist acts. 74 The proposed convention of the International
Law Association mentioned above delineates state responsibil-
ity for terrorism. 75 Under this proposal, liability of a state for
damages related to international terrorist offenses would be
based on a state's failure to:
a. cooperate with other states in the prevention of interna-
tional terrorist offenses within their territory; 76
b. extradite or expel alleged terrorists found within their
territory; or
c. submit alleged terrorists to competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution or allow extradition to another
country.77
Thus, state sponsorship of terrorism can range from a state
being directly behind the terrorist attacks, to less direct state
72 See JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989).
73 See generally A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Re-
port of the Sixth Committee available at http://www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/htm.
74 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
75 See Draft Single Convention on the Legal Control of International Terror-
ism, supra note 8, at 497-504.
76 The proposal requires states to take "all practicable measures" to prevent
terrorism. Id. at 500, art. V (1).
77 See id. at 501, commentary to the preamble, 500, art. V.
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involvement such as providing training, financing, or support
one way or another, to even less direct state involvement by
"tolerating," while not specifically supporting or approving, a
particular terrorist group. Using a state's territory as a location
from which to launch terrorist attacks is something that, if tol-
erated, suggests that the state involved has in effect aided and
abetted the terrorist group by "looking the other way."
In Afghanistan, the Taliban appears to have been both di-
rectly and indirectly supportive of terrorists within its borders
by consistently permitting, failing to suppress, and tolerating
international terrorists in their use of Afghanistan as a center
for training camps, supply, and staging operations, and in re-
fusing to cooperate in the capture of Osama bin Laden.
In what the White House calls the Bush Doctrine, Presi-
dent George W. Bush defines state sponsored terrorism as fol-
lows: "If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or
arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist or
fund a terrorist, you're a terrorist, and you will be held account-
able by the United States and our friends."78
Under the law of states, the states appear to have a duty to
apprehend and bring justice to those who commit terrorist acts
within its territory. 79 No prosecution at all for local acts of ter-
rorism, release of terrorists following prosecution, or prosecu-
tion followed by light punishment or pardon are breaches of a
state's duty.80 This would seem to be part of the complaints ten-
dered by Israel against Yassir Arafat; that he jails known ter-
rorists only to release them at the earliest opportunity.
State sponsored terrorism can also involve a state that per-
mits free entry or grants safe haven or safe passage of a known
terrorist who flees from one country to another.8 1 One commen-
tator has suggested that a state should be culpable as an acces-
sory-after-the fact when it fails to punish or extradite
terrorists.8 2 Asylum cases involving hijackers of civilian aircraft
in the 1970s involved persons who maintained that the crimes
78 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Says War May Go Beyond Afghan Border, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at B2.
79 See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 58, at 278.
80 See id. at 280.
81 See id. at 278, 298.
82 See id. at 278.
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they committed were political acts entitling them to refuge.8 3
About seventy percent of incidents up to 1974 involving hijack-
ings that terminated in a state other than where the aircraft
was seized, resulted in asylum being granted to the hijackers.8 4
But clearly, it is contrary to international norms for a state to
grant asylum status to anyone seeking to avoid prosecution for
a terrorist act or other serious non-political crime, as distin-
guished from a political act.8 5 If a state grants asylum to a ter-
rorist, other states have few means at their disposal to obtain
the return of the fugitive, short of invoking an extradition
treaty, if applicable, a route that has generally been far from
promising because the decision whether to extradite or not rests
with the domestic state, which can invoke the "political offense"
exception found in most extradition treaties.8 6 The modern
view, however, is that ordinary terrorists cannot legitimately
claim the benefits of the "political offense" exception.8 7 Even
acts of a quasi-political character are not ordinarily within the
"political offense" exception. For instance, the United States
sought to extradite a man charged with bombing four buildings
at the University of Wisconsin, who fled to Canada. The ex-
traditee argued that the offenses were of a "political character,"
since he bombed the buildings to protest U.S. involvement in
the Vietnam War. This argument was rejected by the courts.88
In sum, the majority view under international law holds that
terrorism, however politically motivated it is claimed to be (and
83 See id. at 298.
84 See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 58, at 298.
85 See id. at 299.
86 See id. at 299-300. One school of thought holds that the "political offense"
exception can be used to support the view that a terrorist attack (i.e., assassina-
tion) on a head of state qualifies as a "political offense." See id. at 300. In Great
Britain, however, the view is "that in order to constitute a political offense, and
thus bar extradition, the act must have occurred within the context of a struggle
between two parties fighting for control of the government of a state." Id. at 301.
Anarchists are deemed excluded from the "political offense" exception in that they
direct their attacks against the general body of citizens. See id.
87 See id. at 301.
88 See id. at 300-301. In another case the law on this point was articulated by
Lord Hodson as follows: "[Miembers of political organizations may commit all sorts
of infractions of the criminal law in the belief that by so doing they will further
their political ends, but these crimes do not automatically become offences of a
political character. Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, 2 All E. R. 204,
207 (H.L.) (1973).
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it invariably is asserted to be politically motivated by the ac-
tors), does not fall within the "political offense" exception.8 9 The
minority view, in which granting of safe haven to terrorists has
been the practice, prevails in certain Middle East countries,
part of Latin America, and elsewhere. 90 Of course, when ter-
rorists escape from the jurisdiction in which they make their
attack and seek asylum in a state having no extradition treaties
with potential extraditing states, the "political offense" excep-
tion does not come into play.91 Still, if a state harbors fleeing
terrorists and refuses to hand them over to the requesting
states or to prosecute them on its own, the state ought to be
held as a principal to the crime of aiding and abetting.92 In the
absence of a treaty, the requesting state may need to rely upon
diplomatic means to apprehend and punish transnational
terrorists.
It should also be noted that terrorism by definition involves
a politically motivated objective, such as the "liberation" of Pal-
estine or the "cleansing" of Jerusalem. 93 In situations such as
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the Palestinian
suicide bombers argue that their acts of violence are legitimate
efforts to exercise self-determination, even when the violence is
directed against civilians. 94 In fact, it is argued that the vio-
lence exercised by Palestinian groups should not be called ter-
rorism, but that Israeli responses to Palestinian violence
constitute terrorism.95 On the other hand, Israel sees its mili-
tary responses to Palestinian suicide bombers as justifiable in
the same way as America's assault on Al Qaeda in the war in
Afghanistan. 96
89 See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 58, at 303.
90 See id.
91 For instance, in the Rome Airport massacre in 1973, in which two Arab
terrorists attacked Israeli passengers, the terrorists fled to Kuwait, where they
were virtually assured of obtaining asylum. See id. at 304. While the governments
of Italy, Morocco, West Germany and the United States sought to have the ter-
rorists extradited, Kuwait had no extradition treaties with the requesting states
and therefore had no international legal duty to grant their requests; moreover,
the government of Kuwait announced that the act was of a political character. See
id.
92 See id. at 305.
93 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 632.
94 See id. at 640, n.60.
95 See id.
96 See Purdum, supra note 32.
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V. THE TALIBAN'S RISE TO POWER IN AFGHANISTAN
"Taliban" is Arabic for religious students. 97 The Taliban
were established in Pakistan as a movement involving "relig-
ious schools known as deeni madaris, during the Afghan-Soviet
War."98 The dramatic exodus of six million Afghan refugees to
Pakistan and Iran during the decade-long, brutal Afghan-Soviet
War fueled the Taliban movement with disgruntled young Af-
ghan refugees who studied in these Pakistani religious
schools. 99 The Taliban have assumed the role of a military-polit-
ical governing elite, a kind of religious regency.
In 1994 the Taliban spread into southern Afghanistan with
the leadership of a religious teacher, Mawlawi Mohammed
Omar.100 Most of the Taliban were Afghans who, as refugees,
had trained in religious schools in Pakistan along with former
Islamic fighters (mujahedin). These former Afghan refugees
were appointed by the Islamabad government to protect a con-
voy trying to open up a trade route between Pakistan and Cen-
tral Asia.' 0 ' They drove off other mujahedin factions who
attacked and looted the convoy. The group went on to take the
city of Kandahar, and in other advances, captured the capital,
Kabul, in September 1996.102 Ordinary Afghans, weary of the
prevailing lawlessness in many parts of the country with war-
ring mujahedin factions were pleased by the Taliban success in
stamping out banditry, restoring some measure of peace, and
allowing commerce to flourish again. 0 3 They garnered consid-
erable popular acceptance based on an understandable disgust
with protracted civil war and a simple desire for personal secur-
ity.104 Their refusal to deal with the existing warlords whose
97 See William Maley, Interpreting the Taliban, in FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN?
AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALiBAN 1 (William Maley ed., 1998).
98 Christopher L. Gadoury, Should the United States Officially Recognize the
Taliban? The International Legal and Political Considerations, 23 No. 2 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 385, 386 (2001).
99 See id. at 389.
100 See generally The Taliban Regime, Historical Background available at
http:www.afghan-info.com/TALIBAN.htm.
101 See Analysis: Who are the Taleban?, BBC NEWS, Dec. 20, 2000, at http:ll
www.news.bbc.co.ukfhi/english/world/south-asia/newsid_144000/144382.stm.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See generally Minh T. Vo, New Lid on Afghanistan, But Will it Hold? March
1999 available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/03/16/p9sl.htm.
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rivalries had caused so much killing and destruction also
earned them respect.105
The Taliban's stated purpose was to liberate Islamic lands
from what they regarded as an "atheistic, faithless American
tyranny."10 6 Muslim scholars generally view the Taliban's
brand of Islam as simply not based on the teachings of Islam. 10 7
The Taliban's edicts, discussed in Part IIV infra, are in clear
contradiction of traditional Islamic teachings that insure its fol-
lowers rights that are parallel to those in the Declaration of In-
dependence, such as protections of life, liberty, honor and
human dignity.108 The Koran proclaims that human beings
have the right to protest against a government's tyranny. 10 9
The Koran protects freedom of religion and freedom of con-
science.' 10 Islam ensures that all men and women have the
right to education and work."' The attainment of justice is the
foundation of Islam and this cannot be achieved unless human
rights are secured for every individual and group in a Muslim
state." 2 The members of such a state must be free to choose
just rulers, to observe these rules as they practice their author-
ity, and to stand firm against any injustice from them. Thus,
the Taliban's edicts abridging its peoples' freedom of expression,
the right to education, and so on, represent a distortion of the
Koran.
VI. RELIGIOUS TERRORISM BASED ON JIHAD
"The most serious terrorist attacks of the [past] decade
have all had a significant religious dimension ... or motiva-
tion."113 As instruments of divine will, religious terrorists, com-
105 See id.
106 Abu Abdul Aziz A1-Afghani, The Islamic Taliban Movement, at http:l/
www.islam.org.au/articles/18/talibanl.htm.
107 See The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation, Hearing Before the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess., 868 (2000).
108 See Koran, 49:11-12, available at http://www.hti.umich.edu/k/koran
browse.html.
109 See id at 4:148.
110 See id. at 2:256.
111 See id. at 35:28, 4:32.
112 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 634-35.
113 BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM, 92 (Columbia University Press)
(1998).
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pared to secular terrorists, seek to fulfill a goal of limitless
violence in pursuit of a sanctified objective. 114
Religious terrorists do not adhere to the political or societal
boundaries that may constrain other terrorists. Religious ter-
rorists have little concern for their own death, and apparently
they have no qualms about using such unconventional and le-
thal means as hijacking aircraft and crashing them to carry out
what is perceived to be a divine duty.
"Terrorists need religion because religion can provide a
most compelling legitimacy for killing and dying especially in
situations when political appeals may be ineffective. Religion,
moreover, seems to need terror, for religion deals with the ulti-
mate issues of order and disorder and good and evil."115
The Al Qaeda terrorist group was established by Osama bin
Laden in 1990 with a goal to "reestablish the Muslim State"
throughout the world.' 16 Bin Laden issued a fatwa for Muslims
to conduct ajihad or holy war, and under this fatwa, "Muslims
have a religious duty to wage war on U.S. citizens anywhere in
the world." 117
Literally, jihad does not mean "fighting" or "war" at all, but
is translated more accurately as "effort," "attempt," or "exer-
tion," as in the exertion of one's efforts to overcome evil.118 The
Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Washington-based
group, denies thatjihad means "holy war."1 19 Rather, the term
pertains to moral self-improvement, "a central and broad Is-
lamic concept that includes the struggle to improve the quality
of life in society, struggle in the battlefield for self-defense... or
fighting against tyranny or oppression."120 Jihad is considered
114 A secular terrorist is one whose agenda and methods are to advance a spe-
cific political goal.
115 Patricia A. Long, In the Name of God: Religious Terrorism in the Millen-
nium, An Analysis of Holy Terror, Government Resources, and the Cooperative Ef-
forts of a Nation to Restrain its Global Impact, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 51,
52 (2000), citing INSIDE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 7 (David C. Rapoport ed., 1988).
116 See id. at 59, n.32 citing U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Ter-
rorism 1998, (April, 1999).
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 See generally Phillip Kurata, Islamic Scholars Reject Bin Laden's Call for
Jihad Against Americans (Oct. 2001) available at http://usinfo.state.gov.usa/islam]
al01801a.htm.
120 Douglas E. Streusand, What Does Jihad Mean?, MIDDLE E. Q. at 1 (1997).
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to be a duty of the faithful to preserve Islam in an honorable,
purposeful inward struggle or effort directed against evil in one-
self or directed outward against injustice rather than an uncon-
trolled or violent act of destruction. 121 Jihad, in Islamic
jurisprudence, is the concept of "struggle" to spread the worship
of Allah. 122 While most modern branches of Islam stress the in-
ner, spiritual jihad, some radical sects have the idea that jihad
means a spiritual quest in which all nations must surrender to
Islamic rule. 123 Until that time, all able-bodied Muslims are ex-
pected to take part in hostile jihads against polytheists. Some
radical Islamic fundamentalists consider fihad to be a quest
that knows no end until total victory is achieved. 124 They be-
lieve that those who die in this type of jihad automatically be-
come martyrs of the faith and are awarded a special place in
heaven. 125
The translation of jihad as "holy war" is misleading, since
Islam has never justified a war to impose its faith on others by
force. Jihad only aims to prevent intimidation, 126 not to spread
it. The Koran states that jihad is allowed for Muslims only to
repel those who initiate an attack: "And fight in God's cause
against those who are waging war against you, and do not
transgress limits, for God loves not transgressors."1 27 The idea
is to "fight against the one that practices aggression." 128 Once
the aggressor surrenders, it should be treated with justice.
Moreover, justice and fairness should dominate the relationship
between Muslims and believers of other faiths. 129 Islamic jus-
tice accepts no collective accusations or punishments.
3 0
121 See generally Jihad, from Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion, ed. Robert
Wunthnow. 2 vols (Washington D.C. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998) availa-
ble at http://www.cqpress.com/context/articles/eprjihad.html.
122 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 642.
123 See generally World Islamic Front Statement, Jihad Against Jews and Cru-
saders (Feb. 1998) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980 2 2 3-
fatwa.htm.
124 See id.
125 See AmvR TAHERI, HOLY TERROR: INSIDE THE WORLD OF IsLAMIc TERRORISM
17 (Adler & Adler) (1987).
126 See Koran, supra note 108, at 2:193.
127 Id. at 2:190.
128 Id. at 49:9.
129 See id. at 60:8.
130 See id. at 53:38-9.
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VII. PERMISSIBLE STATE RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ACTS
If a terrorist attack occurs outside the borders of a group
that is sponsored by a state, the question arises: to what extent
may a state lawfully respond with armed force against the state
that has sponsored the terrorists deemed responsible for the
attack?
Under international law, the response of a targeted state is
predicated on principles of self-defense, and these are in turn
based on what the international community regards as the "in-
herent" right of national security and the attendant duty to pro-
tect one's citizens from terrorist attacks. 131 The norms of self-
defense revolve around survival, autonomy, and dignity, and
are parallel to the common law of self-defense in Western juris-
prudence. 132 Clearly, we start with the principle that a state
has the inherent right to protect and defend its sovereignty.
The drafters of the U.N. Charter did not contemplate the
existence of international terrorists. 133 The U.N. Charter sim-
ply does not directly address the subtler modes in which ter-
rorists can operate in the post-World War II period. The U.N.
Charter has as its primary goal the prevention of war by work-
ing with the political system to govern conflicts between
states. 34 The framers of the U.N. Charter "did not fully antici-
pate the existence, tenacity and technology of modern day
terrorism."135
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter says that Member States
"shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations." 36 But Article 51 of the U.N.
131 See generally U.N. Secretary General Affirms U.S. Rights to Self-Defense
(Oct. 2001) available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01100903.htl.
132 See generally Mark A. Drumbl, Judging Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt,
Self-Defense, and Western Innocence (2001) available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
terrorismdrumbl.htm
133 See Travalio, supra note 67, at 156.
134 See James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and
Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 310
(1987).
135 Mark Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. IN'L L. 25 (1987).
136 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
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Charter recognizes the right of self-defense as an exception to
this ban.137 Thus, Article 2(4) does not appear to apply to at-
tacks on military bases of another state where there is evidence
that the host nation was actively engaged in sponsoring
terrorists.138
The language of Article 5 is thought to lend itself to an ex-
pansive interpretation, so that in today's world, with today's
military capabilities, the manner in which a state protects itself
from suffering a further attack must be flexible. "A sound con-
struction of Article 51 would allow any State, once a terrorist
'attack occurs' or is about to occur, to use force against those
responsible for the attack in order to prevent the attack or to
deter further attacks unless reasonable ground exists to believe
that no further attack will be undertaken." 39 This would seem
to be consistent with the overall aim of the U.N. Charter to de-
ter armed conflict.
Self-defense by the drafters of the U.N. Charter was ad-
dressed in the context of large-scale attacks by the regular
armed forces of one state against the territory of another, not
the mere harboring or a terrorist group. 140 Given the radically
different world we live in compared to 1949, Article 51 has to be
interpreted more broadly. A terrorist organization does not ex-
ist to plan one isolated incident that occurs and then is over
with. Rather, terrorism involves a drawn out, patient, sporadic
pattern of attacks. It is very difficult to know when or where the
next incident will occur. This state of affairs was simply not con-
templated at the time the U.N. Charter was drafted.
The right of self-defense under Article 51 must be read to
include all of the rights of self-defense that existed in customary
international law at the time it was drafted.14 And the custom-
ary right of self-defense has included instances in which mili-
tary force might be legally appropriate as self-defense, even
when no armed attack has occurred. 142 I think it would be ab-
surd to suggest (as some writers do) that thwarting a clear con-
137 See id. art. 51.
138 See Travalio, supra note 67, at 172.
139 Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL.
L. REV. 89, 95 (1989).
140 See Travalio, supra note 67, at 156.
141 See id. at 159.
142 See id. at 160.
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spiracy to commit a future attack, even though there is no
present or imminent "armed attack," would not be an instance
of self-defense. The right of self-defense, even in the absence of
an imminent "armed attack," was illustrated in 1998 with the
military action taken against Osama bin Laden's network and a
factory in the Sudan:
With the information that bin Laden had attacked Americans
before and planned to do so again, that he was seeking chemical
weapons to use in future attacks, that he was cooperating with
the government of Sudan in those efforts, that the Sudan's Al
Shifa plant was linked both to bin Laden and chemical weapons,
didn't the United States government have a responsibility to the
American people to counter this threat? I believe the unequivocal
answer is yes. 143
Even under the most stringent reading of Article 51, "the
inherent right of self-defense in the face of an armed attack"
permits a victimized nation to engage in "unilateral or collective
self-defense until and unless the Security Council has ad-
dressed the issue."1 44 And nothing in the U.N. Charter restricts
the identity of aggressors against whom states may respond,
since private agents as well as governments may be the sources
of aggression.
Under the U.N. Charter, 145 unilateral acts of force not char-
acterized as self-defense, regardless of motive, are generally il-
legal. There are three main principles that go into examining
the jus ad bellum dimensions of a state's response if it has suf-
fered a terrorist attack.146 These principles assist in deciding
how a state may respond, that is, whether the state may take
action in the form of anticipatory self-defense or preemptive
strikes or other means. The principles are found in the U.N.
Charter, and deal with the timeliness of the response, and the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. 14 7 In this section
I discuss the following:
a. What constitutes a "timely" response to a terrorist
attack?
143 Samuel Berger, Why the U.S. Bombed, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1998, at A21.
144 Wedgwood, supra note 70, at 564.
145 See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51.
146 See id.
147 See id. arts. 2(4), 51.
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b. What constitutes a necessary, "proportionate," response
to a terrorist attack? and
c. Toward whom may a state's response legitimately be di-
rected? To individual terrorists? Or to the state that supports
or sponsors the terrorist group? Or to both? And in responding
directly to the sponsoring state, what specific installations,
posts or structures constitute proper targets of the response?
A. What Constitutes a Timely Response?
The further away a state gets from "on-the-spot" responses,
the more difficult the international community may find it to
agree that the act was self-defense. The response should have a
close proximity to the time of the attack. With terrorism, it
must be kept in mind that the targets of a response to terrorists
are not readily identifiable, particularly if the terrorists are in
hiding. It is debatable whether and the extent to which a state
should first attempt diplomatic or other peaceful means before
forcibly acting. But if diplomatic efforts are advanced, a state's
response might need to be delayed until long after the terrorist
attack has ceased. A state needs to have a more calculated re-
sponse when its sovereignty is threatened, for a great deal is at
stake, and in regions such as Afghanistan, with difficult terrain,
underground canals, and bunkers in caves, there is a unique
complexity in planning a response, so that military planning
and deployment takes a bit of time.
B. What Constitutes a Necessary, "Proportionate" Response?
Should the response be "eye-for-an-eye" or broader, to take
into account short or long-term strategic deterrence of terrorism
or even acts of reprisal? 148 A tit-for-tat defense may not easily
protect against the ambitions of a complex terrorist organiza-
tion. Terrorism by its very nature is characterized by a continu-
ing, but intermittent threat, followed by acts of extreme
violence. The end of one terrorist attack does not end the
threat. In fact, it is the very prospect of future attacks at uncer-
tain times and places with unknown means that terrorists hope
148 See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": Interna-
tional Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153, 205
(1994).
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will instill fear in the populace of the target state and result in a
change of policy.
The concept of proportionality, strictly speaking, considers
only the wrongs committed in the past, and a strictly construed
proportionality would tend to rule out any "deterrence" or "re-
prisal," as well as even a single larger retaliatory response. 149
Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, if strictly construed, the
right to take forcible action after a terrorist attack would exist
only if the attack occurred upon the victim state's own territory,
and that the response would be strictly speaking "on-the-spot,"
proportionate to the attack itself, narrowly focused on targets
directly associated with the attackers, and with no "repri-
sals."150 The international community on the whole rejects a
strict construction of this principle, recognizing that in order to
effectively make terrorist attacks cease altogether, the response
needs to be sufficient enough to persuade the terrorists not to
undertake future attacks. 151 Military planners in the interna-
tional community believe they have the right to implement a
response to terrorism that is reasonably calculated to prevent
future attacks, and that this objective fits within the propor-
tionality principle:
If proportionality consists of a reasonable relation of means to
ends, it would not be disproportionate if in some cases the retalia-
tory force exceeded the original attack in order to serve its deter-
rent aim. One might say that the force would have to be sufficient
to cause the terrorists to change his expectations about costs and
benefits so that he would cease terrorist activity. 152 (emphasis
added)
A proportionate response takes into account the kinds of
military force that will play a role in the response. The response
can range from rescue missions, attacks on terrorist bases, in-
terceptions of aircraft and vessels bearing suspected terrorists,
freezing of terrorist funds, attacks on military leaders of the
149 See Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense
Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 559, 583 (2002).
150 See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 2(4), 51.
151 See Beard, supra note 149, at 590.
152 Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Ba-
ses, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 315 (1989). See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combat-
ing State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 282 (1987).
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sponsoring state, covert assassinations of terrorist leaders, or
other assassinations of terrorist leaders. 153
In evaluating self-defense the proportionality issue takes
into account the single-minded structure and the purpose of
plots of a given terrorist organization. For instance, if an organ-
ization is developing a biochemical factory for which there is no
legitimate purpose other than to manufacture nerve gas, the
proportionality issue would authorize a military strike. An ex-
ample of this was in August 1998, when the U.S. launched
cruise missiles against such a factory in the Sudan. 54
The idea of strategic deterrence to deter future terrorist at-
tacks is not without controversy. The consensus of the interna-
tional community is that acts of retaliation, deterrence or
reprisal against terrorists can fit into the doctrine of self-de-
fense. 155 The idea is that in any military response to terrorism,
it is important to view the overall pattern and total context of
hostilities as well as the broader political and military situa-
tion, any continuing patterns, and logical projections of future
events, rather than focus merely on past acts. 156 The interna-
tional community generally acknowledges that the proportion-
ality question in self-defense may take into consideration an
aggregation of past as well as current attacks called "cumula-
tive proportionality.' 1 57 On the cumulative proportionality
analysis, sometimes an accumulation of prior events may sug-
gest a response greater than mere tit-for-tat and be justified as
"proportional" based on the past set of facts. The idea here is
that the severity of the injury to the state caused by the terror-
ist act or acts should be evaluated. The most damaging acts are
those that strike at the core of a nation's sovereignty, including
the assassination or attempted assassination of a government
official, the destruction of a major government installation, or
the killing of a large group of nationals.
In assessing proportionality, another relevant factor is
whether the terrorist attack was one that violated a state's ter-
153 See id.
154 See Wedgwood, supra note 70, at 575.
155 See Beard, supra note 149.
156 See William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in
Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 472 (1990).
157 See Beck & Arend, supra note 148, at 206.
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ritorial integrity or simply occurred within the host state's own
borders. The latter situation may not even constitute an in-
stance of terrorism if, in fact, it rises to the standards of lawful
insurrection discussed above. Situations in which a state's own
borders are invaded by the terrorist attack constitute an inher-
ently greater injury to that state's sovereignty than does an
identical act abroad.
Some suggest that we should disregard the question of pro-
portionality altogether and simply stipulate that future deter-
rence is always a consideration in self-defense.' 5 8
Strategic deterrence is designed to unsettle the core of the
terrorist organization, to turn their concern to mere survival,
and to undermine or destroy their cohesion, morale, recruit-
ment ability, and their overall readiness capability. The ratio-
nale behind this is that terrorism is a crime, and as with any
law enforcement target, the goal is apprehension and punish-
ment. Also, when a terrorist group is deterred, it becomes de-
legitimized in the public perception, so that they can be widely
viewed as the criminals that they are. 159
In assessing proportionality, one must consider the level of
control by the host state. Thus, destruction of facilities of the
host country is a proper means of convincing the host country to
stop its support of terrorists if, in fact, the state directly sup-
ports the terrorists. It is a close question as to whether force
should be used against a power plant of the host country that
supplies power to the terrorists, and also supplies power to the
civilian population. The various scenarios that have been dis-
cussed in military classrooms often take into consideration the
dilemmas of bombing strategic enemy sites and the accompany-
ing risk to innocent civilians.
If military planners exceed the proportionality principle, it
is possible individuals involved could be "guilty of war crimes
and possibly even crimes against humanity."160
Perhaps the most effective method of countering terrorism
is psychological warfare. The terrorist depends heavily on psy-
chology. Within the host nation, terrorist organizations seek to
158 See id.
159 See L. Paul Bremer, II, Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics, 88 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 47 (1988).
160 Beres, supra note 52, at 9.
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win popular support and a sympathetic ear. Countermeasures
need to be in the form of an effective campaign to destroy the
credibility and sincerity of terrorists in the eyes of the public,
who have become captives of the terrorists, and to induce a shift
in public loyalty away from the terrorists. That is accomplished
through detrimental publicity, showing the public that the ter-
rorists alone are responsible for the ills of their country, and
other skillful use of media to destroy the credibility of the
terrorists.
Thus, military self-defensive action may be prudent when
one takes into account the scope of the danger presented by the
terrorist network, the general fact that "terrorism presents a
threat that is quantitatively and qualitatively different"161 from
other kinds of attacks, and the fact that terrorists are fanatics
in their beliefs so that they are "not constrained by the practices
of traditional diplomacy, nor subject to the kind of economic and
political sanctions that might be effective against states."1 62
C. Toward Whom or What May a State's Response
Legitimately Be Directed?
Regardless of the heinousness of a terrorist attack, the
proper target of the response begins with the fundamental pre-
mise that under no circumstances are "innocents" proper
targets. This requires no more than the ordinary humanitarian
rules applicable to armed conflict. Thus, the general prohibi-
tions against targeting non-combatants or excessive destruction
of civilian property apply. The fact that terrorist bases are
found in the midst of cities, and may therefore be "shielded" by
non-combatants, can give rise to a difficult dilemma. It is none-
theless desirable to recognize legal as well as moral restraints
relating to non-combatants.1 63
Thus, it is an objective in these operations to avoid collat-
eral damage to innocent populations. When terrorist military
structures are placed in close proximity to civilian sites, the
moral dilemma has to be analyzed by strategic planners. It ap-
pears that there is no international rule that obligates nations
161 Travalio, supra note 67, at 168.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 315.
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"to forego a legitimate military target" that may entail injury to
civilians situated nearby.164
The targets of a response may turn in part on what was
targeted in the terrorist attack. Attacks against a nation's mili-
tary or diplomatic installations, or against political or other offi-
cial structures constitute an act of war under international law,
compared with terrorist attacks involving nonmilitary, nongov-
ernmental personnel and buildings. 165 When a large number of
nationals are attacked solely on the basis of their nationality,
such an attack might clearly impact a state's national security
and cause the state injury of such major significance as to
threaten its sovereignty and therefore constitutes an act of war.
If the terrorist attack rises to the level of an act of war and in-
volves state-sponsored terrorism, it is proper to target the host
state's military installations as well as those of the terrorists. 166
In any situation involving a terrorist attack, the terrorist
leaders and their members are proper targets of a response.
Osama bin Laden is not a head of state, and the long-standing
American prohibition on assassination of political officials is not
applicable. 167 The U.S. Army claims that the "clandestine, low
visibility, or overt use of force against legitimate targets in time
of war, or against similar targets in time of peace, where such
individuals or groups pose an immediate threat . . . does not
constitute assassination."1 68
VIII. CONCLUSION
According to Sir William Blackstone in his celebrated Com-
mentaries, American leaders are expected in all circumstances,
"to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common
law: by inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses
against that universal law .... ",169 In other words, higher law
164 Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 211 (1987).
165 See Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297-98 (1987).
166 See Beard, supra note 149, at 583.
167 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1981) prohibits the assassination of
heads of state.
168 Paul Richter, White House Justifies Option of Lethal Force Policy: Despite
Assassination Terrorists Are Targeted, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at All.
169 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries [73].
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imposes an obligation on the United States to oppose and pun-
ish terrorist crimes.
Policies to address terrorism sometimes collide with human
rights and civil liberties. The intrusions on liberties lie at some
uncomfortable midrange between peacetime living and wartime
emergencies. The freedoms of democracy may need modification
to permit strong action for thwarting terrorists on our shores.
When debating this issue, Americans must balance idealism
with reality and recognize that terrorism is a national security
issue. Of course, civil liberties are important for our democratic
society, but in times of war it becomes necessary to reconfigure
some aspects of our concept of democracy in light of the exigen-
cies of adversarial violence.
Through this article, I have attempted to show the unique
impact that a state-sponsored terrorist regime can wreak. The
international community needs to employ a common analytical
framework to facilitate its discourse on terrorism. It appears
that Afghanistan has become the world's most obvious example
of the combination of an extremist regime that at the same time
sponsors terrorist organizations within its borders. The Afghan
people themselves have been restless throughout their civil
wars and the rise of Taliban power. They do not enjoy basic
human dignities that are sacrosanct to the rest of the world.
Afghans, just like ordinary people in other nations, want to
have better futures for their children and more possibilities for
work. 170 The international community should realize that the
solution to terrorism lies more in its prevention than in its cure.
Terrorist attacks of any kind can succeed, at least temporarily,
in disrupting the infrastructural equilibrium of the targeted na-
tion. But state-sponsored terrorism not only impacts the
targeted population, but tends to unhinge the very structure of
the local society, whose social and economic stability, in the case
of Afghanistan, hover on the brink of collapse.
170 See id. at 418.
20021
33
PACE INT'L L. REV.
IX. APPENDIX
A. The Impact of State-sponsored Terrorism in Afghan
Society
State-sponsored terrorism has a unique qualitative impact
on a society such as Afghanistan in terms of the amount of suf-
fering generated within its host society. After the Afghan-So-
viet War ended in 1989, Afghanistan "was unable to find an
effective leader who could win the respect of the rival factions"
that were an undercurrent in the nation's tribal society. 171
There was widespread struggle for power by various parties,
militias and clans, with cities in a state of "complete anarchy,"
gangs and armed highwaymen battling over drug dealings and
looting.172 In the 1980s, Afghanistan suffered an anti-commu-
nist insurgency backed by the West, and in the 1990s a civil war
began which continued through the events of September 11,
2001.
In 1994, the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad
Omar, claimed that the Taliban would be the vehicle by which
peace can be restored in Afghanistan.1 73 By 1995 the Taliban
had gained control of one-third of the country, and by 1997 it
had gained two-thirds of the country. 174 The Taliban credits it-
self with maintaining order, and, at least until September 11,
2001, the Taliban had gained control of 95% of Afghanistan. 175
It is true that under Taliban rule a measure of safety prevailed
in Afghanistan in that bandits no longer patrolled the
highways.176
171 See Gadoury, supra note 98, at 389.
172 See Carla Power, When Women are the Enemy: Afghanistan's Taliban
Fighters Have Taken the War Between the Sexes to a New Extreme, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 3, 1998, at 37.
173 See Emily MacFarquhar, The Rise of the Taliban: A New Force of Muslim
Fighters is Determined to Rule Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 6,
1995, at 64.
174 See id.
175 See Greg Myre, Taliban Score Military Victories, Seek Diplomatic Payoff in
Afghanistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27212354.
176 See Those Not Very Nice People in Afghanistan: America Hints it May
Recognise the Taliban After a Peace Deal, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1998, at 41. Still, to
critics, to quote one, the "Taliban are anti-women and anti-culture. They want to
show themselves to the West as people who are bringing peace to Afghanistan and
are working for women's rights. This is all nonsense." See Tasgola Karla Bruner,
Signs of Change Detected in Afghanistan's Taliban: Behavior During Hijacking
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For several years the Taliban had sought official recogni-
tion in the international community, but until recently was offi-
cially recognized only by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Pakistan, and now only by one country,
Pakistan.
Afghanistan is an extremely poor country that has been
ravished by two decades of continued war.177 Most of the popu-
lation has insufficient food, clothing, housing, and medical
care. 178 Inflation has been astronomical, as much as 240%.179 A
humanitarian crisis has existed in Afghanistan for many years,
exacerbated by harsh economic sanctions imposed by the
United States and the United Nations in 1998 due to the failure
to turn over Osama bin Laden and others in his Al Qaeda ter-
rorist group and the Taliban's thwarting of humanitarian aid
workers.' 80 In a society where many people are disaffected, op-
portunities for terrorist groups to flourish increase. As men-
tioned above, terrorist organizations can be a catalyst that
attract those with growing feelings of frustration, so that be-
coming a terrorist member becomes a rational choice for them.
Bin Laden and others of his group were indicted by "the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on
November 4, 1998, for the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania." 18 Bin Laden was also indicted in the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, and implicated in
"the 1996 bombing of a U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia, and
the 1997 massacre in Luxor, Egypt in which 58 tourists were
killed."18 2 He was also linked to thirteen men arrested in Jor-
Spurs Hope of Loosened Restrictions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 2000, at
21A.
177 See C.I.A. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, Afghanistan, WORLD FACTBOOK
(2000), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html
[hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK].
178 See id.
179 See Gadoury, supra note 98, at 392.
180 See Amir Sha, Taliban Asks UN to Delay Today's Sanctions Deadline: Is-
lamic Militia Will Not Surrender bin Laden, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 14, 1999, at A28.
See also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/globallterrorism/
ftoinfo_1999.html.
181 Gadoury, supra note 98, at 410.
182 Id.
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dan for conspiracy to plan terrorist attacks against Americans
visiting Jordan during the millennium holiday.183
The sanctions mentioned above required Afghans who re-
ceive cash from relatives abroad, which is a major source of in-
come in Afghanistan, to travel to Pakistan to pick up money
that is mailed to them, because a flight ban prevents interna-
tional mail from entering Afghanistan. 8 4
The Taliban has branded the United Nation's food and
health programs as activities to control or influence parts of Af-
ghanistan, and there are widespread reports of Taliban seizure
of food and- other assets intended for distribution to the Afghan
citizens. 185
The Taliban decided to reconstruct the country's educa-
tional system upon "pure" Islamic principles, free from any
Western decadence.18 6 The Taliban said their aim was to set up
the world's most pure Islamic state, banning Western influ-
ences like television, music, and cinema. Their efforts to eradi-
cate crime were reinforced by graphic, public executions and
amputations.
The Taliban have been characterized as "fearsome funda-
mentalist zealots"'1 7 who "impose the strictest Islamic rule in
the world." 8 8 The Taliban have banned television, cameras (ex-
cept for occasional photojournalistic purposes), videocassette re-
corders, all music, as well as singing birds, kites, flutes, and pet
dogs and cats. "Women are the most severely treated," 8 9 as is
well known, and "men are required to wear beards" of a certain
length. 190 Men are beaten and jailed for wearing beards of in-
sufficient length.' 91 The Taliban's religious police patrol cities
in pickup trucks and "enforce the Taliban's edicts at gunpoint,
with rifle butts," or with beatings. 192 The Taliban's police pub-
183 See Jordan Seizes 13 and Links Them to Afghan Explosives Training, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999 at A13.
184 See Gadoury, supra note 98, at 396.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 Afghanistan: Living with the Taliban, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1999, at 39.
188 Hugh Pope, Reality Check: Afghanistan's Taliban, For Better or Worse,
Seems There to Stay, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at Al.
189 Gadoury, supra note 98, at 392.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 Id.
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licly beat women "for failure to wear burqua"193 properly or "for
not being accompanied by a close male relative. 1 94 The Taliban
drastically limited access of women to medical services and
closed private home-based schools for girls. 195 Since female doc-
tors generally cannot practice and male doctors cannot treat fe-
male patients, there are serious human concerns as to how
women have access to medical care. Many of the country's hos-
pitals are dilapidated, "with no running water, no proper oper-
ating room," and little electricity. 196 In 1998, the Taliban
reportedly allowed women to be treated by male doctors if a
close male relative accompanied them. 197
The Taliban have consistently harassed or shut down hu-
manitarian assistance providers. 198 84% of women reported the
loss of one or more family members to war and about 80% of the
population has been physically displaced one or more times be-
tween 1992 and 1996.199 Many women cannot even afford a
proper burqua gown, and therefore cannot venture outside of
the home. Women's fear of being publicly beaten or arrested by
the Taliban for venturing out of doors without a close male rela-
tive as a chaperone discourages many of them from going
anywhere. 20 0
Prior to the Taliban, Afghan women had a long history of
participation in Afghan society and in political and economic
life, including employment as health professionals, teachers,
and government workers. "Because most women are not al-
lowed to work, many turn to begging on the streets for
money,"201 or they may turn to prostitution in Kabul's brothels
that are actually protected by the Taliban.20 2
Under the Taliban's interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia),
married adulterers are to be stoned to death, while bachelors
193 Id.
194 Id. at 416.
195 Gadoury, supra note 98, at 416.
196 Id.
197 See Physicians for Human Rights, The Taliban's War on Women: A Health
and Human Rights Crisis, available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/health-ef-
fects/exec.html.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 Gadoury, supra note 98, at 417.
202 See id.
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convicted of illegal sexual conduct are given lashes.20 3 Thieves
are punished by having limbs amputated, and murderers are
executed publicly.20 There have been many instances of harsh
executions. For instance, two men convicted of sodomy were
publicly crushed to death by having a tank push a mud wall on
top of them before a large crowd in Kandahar. 20 5 Stoning to
death of women for adultery has been well documented. 2 6 One
woman was beaten to death by the Taliban police because she
exposed her arm while driving, and another was stoned to death
for attempting to leave the country with a man not her rela-
tive. 20 7 Thieves are routinely penalized by having their right
hand amputated. 208
In March 2001, the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad
Omar said all statues should be smashed, including the two
priceless historic Buddhist statues hewn from a solid cliff, dat-
ing about 2,000 years old, which soar above Bamiyan. 20 9 The
Taliban campaign was launched to target all statues in an effort
to remove any reminders of the centuries before Islam when Af-
ghanistan was a center of Buddhist learning and pilgrimage.
The historic statues of Afghanistan "were largely untouched for
more than a millennium after the arrival of Islam, surviving
even the onslaughts of Genghis Khan in the 13th century and
Tamerlane in the 14th century."210 The Taliban ignored all
world pleas, even that of Muslim Pakistan, which urged the
Taliban to preserve the "world's historical, cultural and relig-
ious heritage."21' An Egypt Muslim intellectual said the
Taliban edict was in fact contrary to Islam, which is supposed to
203 See Taliban Publicly Lash Afghan Adulterer in Herat City, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Apr. 26, 1999.
204 See id.
205 See Taliban Crush Two Afghan Sodomists Under Mud Wall, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Mar. 3, 1999.
206 See Afghan Death by Stoning, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2000, at A4 (mother of
seven stoned to death before several thousand spectators at a sports stadium in
Mazar-e-Sharif).
207 See Dr. Lynette J. Dumble, Sanitising the Taliban: A Rose by Any Other
Name, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan 8, 2000, at 39.
208 See Pope, supra note 188.
209 See World Begs Taliban Not to "Vandalize" History, CNN, Mar. 2, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/03/01/afghan.statue/.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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respect other cultures "even if they include rituals that are
against Islamic law."212
A United Nations report gave grisly details of Taliban mas-
sacres carried out in August 1998, in the northern city of Ma-
zar-i-Sharif that resulted in the death of an estimated 8,000
people. 213 According to the report, the killings were "systematic,
planned, and very well organised," with approximately 3,000
Hazaras 214 and thousands of others in ethnic minority groups
summarily executed in their homes or in the street.215 About
300 men and boys were packed into metal containers, which
were then locked and deposited at a desert site, suffocating
them to death. War crimes such as this genocide have occurred
throughout Afghanistan at the Taliban's behest.
In a series of edicts starting in 1998, which quickly brought
the Taliban into conflict with the international community, the
Taliban forbad girls from going to school and women from work-
ing, banned television, card games, chess, playing of musical in-
struments, drawing, listening to music, and prohibited
importing of any statues, fashion catalogs, greeting cards fea-
turing pictures of people, lipstick, nail polish and neckties.
21 6
There can be no transparent windows in houses that have fe-
male occupants; they must be painted over. No shorts are al-
lowed, only long pants, even for athletes. They required the
country's Hindu citizens to wear distinguishing ID badges.2 1 7
The Taliban prohibits converting from Islam, under penalty
of death. In effect, these are badges of second-class citizenship.
The Taliban said that the measure was intended to protect
Hindus from being stopped by the religious police (i.e., the Min-
istry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice). 218
212 Id.
213 See UN Report Details Taliban "killing frenzy," THE NEWS INTERNATIONAL,
Nov. 6, 1998, at http://www.rawa.org/killings.htm.
214 Descendants from Mongols are easy to recognize by their distinctive Asiatic
features, compared with the ethnic Pashtuns who largely compose the Taliban,
and who share the Shia faith with Iran, while the Taliban are Suni Muslims.
215 See id.
216 See Taliban Kisses Goodbye to Lipstick, Movies, CNN, July 20, 2001, at
http://asia. cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central07/19/afghan.ban/.
217 See id.
218 See Afghanistan: Taliban ID Policy Creates Second-Class Citizens, HuMAN
RIGHTS NEWS, May 24, 2001, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/O5/afghan-
0524.htm.
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The Taliban have collected taxes based on the country's
farm production of opium. Afghanistan is the world's largest
producer of opium, with 5100 tons produced in 1999.219 Opium,
the raw material used to make heroin, is Afghanistan's princi-
pal cash crop, and the drug trade is the largest source of income
in the Afghan economy. 220 Clearly the Taliban movement has
relied on drug trafficking for it profits (at least $509 million a
year) from the illicit trade by taxing opium crops at about ten
percent and receiving payments from smugglers in return for
providing them with protection. 221 The Afghan drug trade is
thought to be aiding and abetting Central Asia's ranking as
having the highest heroin addiction rate in the world.222
A United Nations report issued in 2001 stated: "Funds
raised from the production and trading of opium and heroin are
used by the Taliban to buy arms and other war material, and to
finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of
these extremists in neighboring countries and abroad."223 Ac-
cording to U.S. officials, bin Laden was trying to develop a
super-charged drug that would let loose a plague of potent her-
oin on the United States. Called "Tears of Allah," this was de-
signed as a liquid drug, requiring 50 kilograms of opium to
produce one liter of heroin. Bin Laden became involved with the
drug trade as a gesture designed to cement his relationship
with the Taliban, and that bond has predicated the state-sanc-
tioned safe haven in Afghanistan for over five years.
While some efforts of the Taliban have been made in the
past year to limit the drug trade and even to order a ban on
growing opium in exchange for a Bush Administration compen-
sation package of $43 million,224 the Taliban is reported to still
219 See Gadoury, supra note 98, at 420.
220 See id.
221 See id. at 421.
222 See U.S. Dept. Of State, Int'l Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1998)
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics-law/1998_narc-report/
statements98_explan.html.
223 Edward T. Pound and Chitra Ragavan,"Tears of Allah" Another Weapon in
Osama bin Laden's War Against the West (Oct. 4, 2001) available at http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/news/terror/heroin.htm.
224 See Taliban Rulers Ban Poppy Growing, Hous. CHRON., July 29, 2000, at
A30. The Bush Administration gave Afghanistan's Taliban $43 million for food
security programs as a way of compensating them for their agreeing to ban poppy
cultivation. The statistics for 2000 indicate that Afghanistan's production of
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be profiting from the sale of warehoused opium. In any case,
without a viable substitute crop or a functioning economy, no
one can force the farmers to stop growing opium. 225 Some com-
mentators believe the Taliban in fact agreed to a poppy growing
ban knowing that this would reduce supply and drive up the
wholesale price of opium poppy that they had warehoused. The
Taliban stockpiled much of the 2000 crop, and the wholesale
price did in fact rise tenfold to $301 from $30 a kilogram, ac-
cording to the United Nations. 226
Without foreign investment, the outlook for Afghanistan is
bleak.227 Prior to September 11, 2001, an economic project was
in the works with a proposed $2 billion gas pipeline that would
run from neighboring Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, to
Pakistan.228 Foreign investment could be an important step in
slowing down the Afghan drug trade, as well as paving the way
for widespread diplomatic recognition of Afghanistan. 229
Despite initial popular acceptance, the Taliban have failed
to end the civil war and have continued oppressing numerous
ethnic and religious minorities, and they have failed to offer the
Afghan people a better life. The Taliban has had difficulty con-
scripting new recruits due to serious local resistance and low
morale. They have used the easily taxed cash crop of opium in
order to help them finance their regime. And they have con-
doned terrorism by providing, among other things, safe haven
for Osama bin Laden and his network. The Taliban have also
aided and abetted other terrorists worldwide, including violent
groups in Chechnya and Central Asia.230 Thus, many of the
country's problems have actually been aggravated by the
Taliban. The country grew poorer, its resources depleted, its in-
opium was about 3,276 tons, down 28% from the 1999 figure. See Robert Hollo-
way, UN to Reduce Presence in Afghanistan After New Big Opium Harvest, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24710766.
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tive to Cash Crop, Hou. CHRON., May 9, 1999, at A24.
226 See id.
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228 See Hugh Pope, supra note 188.
229 See Beck & Arend, supra note 148, at 153.
230 See The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation, Hearing Before the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, supra note 107, at 868.
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telligentsia in exile, its people disfranchised, its human devel-
opment indices among the lowest in the world.231
Many believe that the Taliban's edicts, which are usually
issued as religious based in conception, are hard to fit into the
traditional teachings of Islam that emphasize the sacredness of
life, honor and human dignity. Commentators are in agreement
that the Koran prohibits people from being imprisoned without
due process; that Islam grants human beings the right to pro-
test against government tyranny; that Islam grants human be-
ings the freedom of thought, expression, association, religious
sentiments, and the right to education and work.232 In addition,
the international community has roundly condemned the
Taliban's system of gender apartheid with regard to the treat-
ment of women. Women's lack of access to work, education and
health have exacerbated starvation, malnutrition, psychological
disorder and other related diseases among women and girls.233
Also impacting society in Central Asia, the Taliban has cre-
ated a significant regional instability: Iran, which has criticized
the Taliban's extreme interpretation of Islam, nearly went to
war with Afghanistan three years ago, when the Taliban killed
11 Iranian diplomats and a journalist. 234 Iran refers to the
Taliban's interpretation of Islamic law as "violent" and "narrow-
minded."235 India's media have described the Taliban as "the
devil's militia," "a shadowy group the world is not comfortable
with," "a monster even its creators cannot contain," and "the
last people on earth that any reasonable human being would
want to interact with."236 Not only Iran, but China, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are concerned
231 See id.
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235 Max Block, Kabul's Health Apartheid, THE NATION, Nov. 24, 1997, at 5.
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at 69. The only positive thing mentioned by the international community about
the Taliban involved their role in ending the December 1999 IndiaAir hijacking.
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Dec. 29, 1999, at A18. During the hijacking crisis, the Taliban served as mediators
between the hijackers and the Indian government, and helped solve the crisis as
well as assured India that the hijackers would not receive asylum in Afghanistan.
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about the spillover of militant Islam into the rest of the
region. 237
In September 2000, dozens of Afghan political and aca-
demic figures held a peace conference to discuss a peaceful solu-
tion to the longstanding civil war in Afghanistan between the
Taliban and other factions, including the Northern Alliance. 238
The Taliban did not even attend the conference, but officials
from the United Nations, United States, Great Britain, Iran,
and Russia did attend.239
In August 2000, the United States and Russia agreed to
work together in seeking expanded U.N. sanctions against the
Taliban to force the Taliban to end state-sponsored terrorism,
and to control the production and trafficking of drugs, and to get
on with developing a broad-based government for Afghani-
stan.240 The Taliban staunchly refused to be moved by these ef-
forts. 24 1 Russia's concern is that the Taliban may seek to spread
their militant form of Islam to the former Soviet states of Cen-
tral Asia-Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. 242
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Sept. 27, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24721777.
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